3260 - SOCIAL DYNAMICS IN TAX COMPLIANCE: THE INDIRECT ECHO EFFECT OF OBSERVING OTHERS' TAX BEHAVIOR

Session: 3136 - NEW AVENUES IN TAX RESEARCH
AUTHORS:
Casal Sandro (University of Trento ~ Trento ~ Italy)
Abstract text:
Our study builds on Mittone's (2006) exploration of the Echo Effect—a cognitive bias whereby early-learned tax behaviors persist in repeated decision-making contexts. In Mittone's 60-round experiment, two groups of participants faced different audit schedules: one group experienced eight audits in the first 30 rounds and none in the last 30, while the other group faced the reverse. The findings showed that early audit experiences shaped long-lasting behavioral patterns: individuals audited early "learned" to comply and continued doing so, whereas those not audited early "learned" to evade and persisted in evasion even once audits were introduced. This persistence, despite changes in audit frequency, illustrates the Echo Effect, where early experiences crystallize into stable habits that endure under shifting conditions. Our study extends this framework by asking whether the Echo Effect can be transmitted across generations. Specifically, we examine whether observing the (non)compliant behavior of others creates similar long-lasting biases. Using a laboratory experiment, we test the presence of this cognitive bias in an intergenerational setting, where successive groups of taxpayers are exposed to varying audit regimes. We investigate whether repeated audits applied to an initial group of taxpayers (the first generation) affect the behavior of a subsequent group (the second generation), who observe the first group's behavior but remain unaware of the audit conditions that shaped it. Our results show that even without direct exposure to audits, second-generation taxpayers tend to adopt the behavioral norms established by the first. When the first generation is subject to frequent audits and develops high compliance, the second generation maintains compliance even under substantially reduced audit pressure. Conversely, when the first generation learns to evade taxes due to infrequent audits, the second generation continues to evade, even if audit intensity later increases.