Nuclear weapon threats increase to levels not seen since the worst periods of the Cold War. There could be value in psychologists documenting and explaining people's responses to nuclear weapons. However, more than three decades have passed since the last major reviews of responses (e.g. Fiske, 1987). We examine how psychologists and researchers from related fields have empirically studied responses to nuclear weapons, since the Cold War ended. A systematic search in Web of Science and SCOPUS identified 18,505 hits. Screening resulted in 256 suitable articles. First, a systematic map reveals that that few articles appeared during the last two decades, with a recent uptick. We also find (2) that author collaborations were scattered and that articles were dispersed across a wide range of journals, from different fields; (3) two dominant semantic themes, with one focusing on beliefs, feelings, and actions, and one on support of nuclear weapon use and nuclear policies. Theories reported ranged widely; (4) relatively few studies employed highly powered and representative samples; and some used validated scales for measuring people's responses. Interest in the field is renewed but there is not yet a coherent research community.
Second, we systematically review articles published between 2000 and 2024. People believe that nuclear war can happen during their lifetime. They are less concerned about nuclear war prevention. Few studies examine feelings: Nuclear anxiety seems prevalent in people living close to Russian borders, in those having experienced false warnings, in those who are approving of progressive parties and in those who worry less about their everyday lives. Few take actions, such as preparing for nuclear terrorist attacks, or engaging politically. This remaining "gap between people's horrific beliefs and their lack of affective and behavioral response" to nuclear weapons (Fiske, 1987) contrasts expert assessments of nuclear weapons threat.