Mental time travel (MTT) — the ability to mentally project oneself into the past or future — has been implicated in moral cognition through its role in anticipating the consequences of actions. Within a dual-process framework, involuntary MTT has been linked to intuitive moral judgments, whereas voluntary MTT may support deliberate reasoning, with impulsivity and self-regulation as plausible factors shaping this process. The present study examined whether self-regulation mediates, and impulsivity moderates, the relationship between MTT and moral judgments, testing whether voluntary MTT predicts self-regulation more strongly than involuntary MTT, and whether the indirect effect of MTT on moral judgments through self-regulation is attenuated at higher impulsivity.
A sample of 138 Romanian adults (aged 18-59; M = 23.37; 115 women) completed measures of voluntary and involuntary MTT, the impulsivity scale, a self-regulation scale, and 90 moral vignettes spanning six foundations (care, fairness, liberty, authority, loyalty, sanctity). A multivariate Bayesian moderated-mediation model was estimated in R (brms) across the six foundations. Both forms of MTT produced credibly null effects on self-regulation (involuntary b = 0.09; voluntary b = 0.10), and all 12 moderated-mediation indices fell within ±0.005 of zero. Higher self-regulation predicted lower acceptability of sanctity violations (b = −0.22, 95% CrI [−0.43, −0.01]).
In conclusion, MTT alone appears insufficient to account for moral judgments, consistent with the view that automatic cognitive processes exert limited influence on deliberate moral reasoning. Hence, other individual differences may better explain how recalled and simulated decisions shape daily moral choices.