therefore how its affirmation or deformation might be judged: doctrine is a matter of intelligence and not of appearance, and so doctrine's development is fundamentally a matter of intelligent coherence. But it is easy to confuse one for the other. For example, in the Catholic struggle to "hold true" to Catholic teaching on matters of gender and sexuality, a genuine point of confusion emerges: confusion over whether every resistance to "new" moral positions is the same as any other. Confusion, too, over just how new these moral positions are, including the Catholic Church's own, since historically the Catholic Church has not had to clarify its morality in these matters in this way in the past. This paper responds by specifying the development of doctrine as an "intelligent repetition." It adapts both Bernard Lonergan and Maurice Blondel in order to comment anew on John Henry Newman's original claim that such development occurs at all. The argument is about what intelligence is and therefore what it would mean to repeat it in history. It uses the example of Lonergan's own expansion of metaphysics to account for statistical probabilities to "test" its case for the difference between intelligent repetition and mere refusal to change. It offers "intelligent repetition" as one way among others to begin disambiguating the larger problems facing modern Christian traditions who have to make sense of their own, confusing confluences of internal coherence and historical change.