The play and figure of Antigone has long occupied a unique position in philosophical investigation, with thinkers such as Aristotle, Hegel, and Kierkegaard drawing on the example of the play and the central figure herself. Simone Weil follows in this philosophical tradition, but I will argue that her engagement with Antigone is of a different quality to perhaps more famous philosophical treatments of both the text and the figure. George Steiner comments that 'she identifies, even more carnally and spiritually than Hegel and Kierkegaard did, with the person and fate of Sophocles' Antigone' (Steiner 2009, 225), which chimes with Sarah Bakewell's judgement of her life as a 'profound and challenging application of Iris Murdoch's notion that a philosophy can be "inhabited"' (2016, 199). Her family labelled her Antigone due to her recklessness in pursuing what she sees as right, and she describes herself as Antigone in her letters, at one point making light of her seeking out suffering as being 'Antigone as usual'. I intend to explore, through her deep, personal engagement and identification with the figure of Antigone, how Weil provides us with a unique moral and philosophical reading of the figure. I will explore how her use of Antigone is an example of an inhabited philosophy where one lives into a historical example: as both a statement on the society and as an exemplar. In particular, I wish to focus on her use of madness and the eternal law as key to how she understands herself as an Antigone figure. The madness that she sees as essential for her morality speaks further to her status as an outsider, and how she uses her moral demands to maintain her marginal status. Having explored how Weil preserves marginality and difference, I end with a reflection on what, if anything, we are to take from her use of Antigone, and her emphasis on madness as key to morality.