In recent years, philosophers of religion have shown interest in empathy, with some proposing that the Christian God is maximally empathetic or "omnisubjective." Yet empathy and subjectivity are distinct forms of social cognition. Empathy, as understood in psychological literature, is a sacrificial and asymmetrical act: the empathizer must bracket their own perspective to enter the experience of another. And in doing so, there is indirect access to the other. In other words, this is always an asymmetrical relationship—the empathizer and the other. This asymmetry is essential to empathy, and it stands in tension with claims that God, as omnisubjective, has direct and complete access to all perspectives. In this paper, I engage arguments for divine omnisubjectivity alongside psychological accounts of empathy to argue that if God is truly omnisubjective, then God cannot also be, strictly speaking, empathetic.