This paper examines the ʾisnād paradigm through Gilles Deleuze's Difference and Repetition, focusing on the Isrāʾ and Miʿrāj narratives. Drawing on Herbert Berg's concept of ʾisnād as a "ritual praxis of cultural memory," it applies Deleuze's first two syntheses of time: habit and memory. It then explores knowledge transmission in Islam as open to a non-propositional truth event. The Isrāʾ and Miʿrāj accounts present a paradox: they are hors-série (P. Nwyia), depicting solitary experiences of the Prophet, not witnessed by others, yet the source of overabundant transmissions. They also exemplify taṣdīq, with Abu Bakr's unwavering acceptance in the sīra making testimony foundational to epistemic authority in the umma. This tension—between an ineffable experience (lack) and an excess of transmissions (surplus)—is encapsulated in Qurʾān 17:1, both an anchor and a site of meaning-making. It reflects the ambiguity between deriving certainty through mutawātir transmissions and S. Ahmed's concept of polycentric meaning-making. Applying Deleuze's concept of habit, the ʾisnād emerges as a series of repetitions contracting differences into a self-conserving present. In light of the second synthesis, the ʾisnād folds past testemonies into a synchronic web of enunciations. But conserving temporal difference implies the generative force of a third moment: a past that never was present. Thus, the ʾisnād does not merely transmit knowledge but generates it through ritualized repetition, revolving around an expressed yet non-propositional event. The ʾisnād derives authority from the umma, where knowledge is authenticated collectively. As Rosenthal notes, "the totality of knowledge was known only to the totality of men." Yet, what if this totality is open and incomplete, with each enunciation introducing the surplus of an unknown? This paper suggests this surplus is already embedded in the Qurʾān, reflecting the tension between its pre-canonical form and the codified muṣḥaf.