Addressing a general public with low level of religious literacy, Russian Orthodox Church, enjoying high level of the public trust, still kept its narratives during Covid-19 in 'theological bubbles', using not widely understandable theological arguments for justification of its position. The 'theological bubbles' found in the religious official documents of Russia raises the question of their target audience. Even if we assume that religious leaders address not urbi et orbi, but mainly their flock, believing citizens, the effectiveness of such communication is significantly reduced precisely because the configuration of the audience's religious literacy is not taken into account. If the addressee of religious messages is the general public, they are even less decodable adequately, because the level of religious literacy in Russia and Belarus is relatively low, due to a number of historical, cultural, and sociopolitical factors. Nevertheless, such a rhetoric did not meet a critical or skeptical attitude of the audience, because believers have no expectations of rational or scientific arguments in official religious discourse. This phenomenon could be explained with the broader processes of mythologization of public discourse in Russia and the increasing sacralization of the profane in the public sphere in recent years (in particular, sacralization of power, justification of violence and war by theological arguments). Attributing profane things as sacred functionally removes them from the space of public debate, which happens more often in Russia. Despite of diametrically opposed state strategies of fighting Covid-19 in Russia and Belarus (Russia's approach being markedly stringent, while Belarus' has been lenient), Russian Orthodox Church in both countries acted as loyal and disciplined alien of the authorities in calling for obedience to government decisions and opposing dissidents.