F. W. J. von Schelling's bold theosophical speculation about God's original self-negation has fascinated contemporary thinkers from Jürgen Habermas to Slavoj Žižek. Scholars, such as Cyril O'Regan, Roswitha Dörendahl and Christoph Schulte, have rightly pointed to the mystical lineage of the idea, probably adopted by Schelling from the Christian kabbalah of Jakob Boehme and Friedrich Oetinger. However, as demonstrated by Gershom Scholem, the idea of divine self-reduction is already to be found in the sixteenth-century Jewish kabbalah of Isaac Luria under the highly ambiguous notion of tsimtsum ("contraction"), which denotes both withdrawal and concentration. In my paper I hypothesize that it is precisely this conceptual ambiguity of tsimtsum that makes Schelling seriously misread the Lurianic idea of God's self-negation. Whereas in Luria's teachings God retreats away from the point to make room for the existence of other, non-divine, beings, in Schelling's Ages of the World He rather concentrates at the point to make room for His own omnipotence. Thus, the act of contraction is no longer about the renunciation of power, but about self-empowerment and the establishment of God's absolute potency. However, I further argue that although in his final work Schelling seems to break with the kenotic sense of tsimtsum, its sacrificial aspect is still present in his thought. To demonstrate this, I will refer to his 1810 Stuttgart lectures, where Schelling originally elaborates on the idea of double contraction, being simultaneously concentration and withdrawal. My final argument is that this dialectical construction—and not its simplistic, one-dimensional variation known from his unfinished 1815 Fragment—shall be considered Schelling's ultimate theosophical doctrine of creation and revelation, coherent with his ontological considerations from Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom.