In 1776, the year of his death, the Scottish philosopher David Hume predicted that Christianity had perhaps two hundred years left ahead of it before ceasing to be the established 'superstition' of the West. In the same year, Adam Smith, the concerted opponent of any form of monopoly, called for the disestablishment of the established churches in the British Isles as monopolies that needed to be opened to competition from other denominations, an underexplored element in the unsystematic argument of the Wealth of Nations. Aspects of Smith's argument shadowed the disestablishment of the Anglican Church in Ireland and in Wales during the nineteenth century, the springtime of gradually but concertedly secularising liberalism; to this day. In 1981, Alasdair MacIntrye identified in Hume's ethical philosophy what he denounced as the relativism of what he called the 'Enlightenment Project', and sought in his celebrated study, After Virtue, to restore a Christian form of Aristotelian virtue politics that was briefly fashionable. This chimed with a moment that Habermas has described as the 'post-secular' reality of modern society. In addition to Humean ethics, secular liberalism has now come under attack from such Catholic critics as Patrick Deneen in his influential study, Why Liberalism Failed (2018), and a historicised revival of the Renaissance virtues has been undertaken by James Hankins in his recent study, Virtue Politics (2019.) With the election of Donald Trump to a second term as President of the United States, traditional liberalism is faced with serious challenges and Christian politics seems to be undergoing a revival, albeit one often critical of the libertarian conservatism of more secular Republicans. Nothing of the sort is apparent in Britain, a much more secular nation. This paper will look at religious transformation in the historical politics of a contested public sphere that is likely to be highly consequential in the decades ahead.