Modern policing is commonly understood as a cornerstone of state order. As the executive instrument of public authority, the police are tasked with maintaining security, enforcing the law, and safeguarding justice, including—under strictly defined conditions—the use of force. Normatively, policing is justified by principles of proportionality, restraint, and equal treatment and is often regarded as indispensable for social stability. At the same time, policing has become the object of sustained critique. Patterns of racial profiling, aggressive stop-and-frisk practices, and recurrent instances of excessive violence reveal persistent gaps between normative ideals and lived realities. Nevertheless, dominant responses continue to frame such incidents as exceptional cases that can be prevented or mitigated through reform measures, including improved training, diversity initiatives, accountability mechanisms, and technological oversight. Police abolitionism challenges this reformist consensus at its core. Rather than treating excessive violence as an anomaly, abolitionist approaches argue that such patterns are structurally produced by the institution of policing itself and cannot be resolved through reform. On this basis, abolitionist positions conclude that policing generates insecurity and should therefore be abolished and replaced by alternative forms of collective safety and conflict resolution. From a theological perspective, these claims raise difficult questions, since state power—and especially the legitimate use of force—is often interpreted as part of a divinely sanctioned order. This paper argues that police abolitionism should be taken seriously as an ethical horizon that challenges established assumptions about state violence, order, and security. Engaging with abolitionist critiques, it contends, is an indispensable task for any theological ethics seeking to reflect responsibly on coercive power in contemporary societies.