In order to critique the punitive practices of the state, it is first necessary to articulate the underlying rationales and objectives that underpin the state's use of punitive measures in the lives of individuals. Criminal theories address this question in a variety of ways. Theories of punishment can be categorized as either absolute or relative. Absolute theories of punishment assume that punishment for punishment's sake is necessary for social peace. In contrast, relative theories of punishment utilize punishment to achieve specific objectives, such as rehabilitation, deterrence, and the prevention of further criminal actions. Both absolute and relative theories of punishment are founded on a particular conception of human nature and an associated anthropological presumption. Theories of punishment are typically predicated on the assumption of rational and responsible subjects. Conversely, the social conditions of constitution and production of subjects are largely overlooked. This paper attempts to address this issue and, in doing so, arrive at a critique of punishment. The paper's critique is rooted in a theological anthropology that conceptualizes humans as vulnerable, social beings embedded in social conditions. This theological framework serves as a foundation for the paper's analysis of common theories of punishment, particularly those that justify state punishment. From the anthropological perspective of structural vulnerability, theories of punishment that are considered absolute appear to be theories of violence. Furthermore, the supposition that humans invariably deliberate on their actions in a rational manner, guided by rational principles, as postulated by theories of punishment, appears to lack substantive justification when evaluated from the standpoint of theological anthropology. From the perspective of theological anthropology, it is thus possible to consider alternatives to the carceral, punitive justice of criminal law.