Contemporary debates about trust tend to focus on the conditions under which this attitude is morally or epistemically appropriate or required — that is, on the moral and epistemic norms of this attitude —, and on its socially valuable function. Relatedly, the question of what being trustworthy is, and of how to identify trustworthy people has been much debated. Comparatively, the question of how to understand the very nature of this attitude has received much less attention. My aim in this talk is to elucidate the nature of trust by examining the (dis)similarities there are between this attitude and secular faith. I shall then to turn to religious faith, the specificity of which should then be better captured. I shall argue that both trust and faith (whether secular or religious) are complex attitudes that involve cognitive, conative and affective dimensions, and that to better understand these attitudes crucial distinctions should be made between propositional, objectual, person-oriented, and non-person-oriented, faith and trust. I shall conclude by examining the question of whether faith and trust are metaphysically incompatible with interrogative attitudes like wondering.