This paper takes a socio-legal approach to the phenomenon of implicit religion in examining what should be understood as a distinctive body of jurisprudence before the European Court of Human Rights: namely, cases which are clearly 'about' religion in that they arise from struggles for freedom from religion - specifically, for freedom from religious influence on public policies - yet they are cases in which religion does not directly factor into the jurisprudence, and thus the religious dimension remains only implicit. This paper makes a strong case for understanding implicit religion before the Court as a distinctive category of legal mobilisation. Examples include cases to do with family, sexuality or bioethics, often described as 'public morality' issues, which include issues of discrimination against children born out of wedlock, abortion, or same-sex marriage. The restrictive position of certain governments on these public morality issues often reflects the persisting influence of the dominant religious tradition in the country concerned. Meanwhile, the legal norms at stake are contested based on the right to privacy, the right to marry or the right to non-discrimination, rather than on the Freedom of Religion or Belief, or even on the right to education in accordance with one's religious or philosophical convictions. However, because in these cases the religious dimension remains implicit and there is no direct reference to religion in the texts as such, this socio-legal 'phenonemon' falls under the radar of many scholars of religion. Thus this paper has the dual aim of presenting an analysis of a sample of this body of jurisprudence, and - at the same time - introducing a research agenda for further study which, amongst other things, will cast light on the socio-political significance of such cases as well as the pressures and challenges that the Court faces in deciding them.