Large Language Models threaten established theories of tools and the use to which they are put by humans. These theories go back to Aristotle, and have learned discussions in the likes of Aquinas and more recently Heidegger. However, as Hannah Arendt and Giorgio Agamben have more recently seen, there is a grave danger in thinking of an LLM merely as a tool. As Arendt foresaw, it is possible for society so to revere a tool or instrument that its humans become increasingly in the role of servant to its mastery. Similarly Agamben, seeking to locate this master-slave reversal in the sacramental notion of ex opere operato, identifies the risks of exposure of human life to such a tool if it is understood merely as an instrument. A theological conclusion of human instrumentality leaves no protection from the inequalities of a world run by a Superintelligence. It is time then for an intervention into the discourse surrounding AI of the notion of life. The contribution of this paper is to introduce a clear focus on 'life' as it is presented by Jesus in the Gospel of John, and to compare that notion to the idea of 'life' in Aristotle and Aquinas. By presenting the difference of the Johannine notion to its prevailing cousins in antiquity (and beyond), this paper will begin to trace a new genealogy for thinking about human life, establishing a surer footing to withstand a tool that can appear to the unequally educated as if it were human.