By the time the SPCU issued its official "guidelines and suggestions to implement NA4", episcopal conferences in the US (1965), France (1967), and Belgium (1969) had already formed ad hoc committees on relations with Judaism and drafted their own texts. As I trace the political, ecclesiological, and theological tensions that shaped the French and US drafting process, I argue these guidelines must be understood not only in relation to the Council declaration they sought to implement but also in competition with a broader set of post-conciliar documents. Catholic experts on Judaism and advocates of dialogue sought to widen the interpretive framework to include political theology, an area deliberately avoided at Vatican II, but which they saw as implied by its teaching on Covenant. Their efforts increasingly met resistance from bishops and/or from the CEF general assembly, as Catholic opinion shifted in front of the Arab-Israeli conflicts after 1967 and 1973. Divergences between expert committees and the episcopal bodies that created them highlight the power dynamics between expertise, hierarchy and the search for consensus in post-conciliar collegiality. These committees grappled with how their work not always aligned other (pontifical and episcopal) statements on Palestine, refugees, and world peace, and with public expectations (both Jewish and Catholic) that Church authorities should "not remain silent" and move beyond the diplomatic neutrality reproached to the Vatican. NA thus prompted a specific "multilateral" reception of Vatica II, where audience and public theology became key issues. The French committee's work unfolded alongside parallel Jewish efforts to assess Christianity from a Jewish perspective. As the project of a joint commission failed, Jewish partners were consulted during the writing process and provided critical feedback. In this way, the issue of audience contributed to shape the ways to elaborate post-counciliar frames of interpretation of NA4