This paper examines the Mosaic law of engagement as a legal and economic institution that structured both normative practices and social reconfigurations. Through a Law and Economics analysis of biblical texts and rabbinic sources, the paper posits that engagement operates as a mechanism that distributes risks asymmetrically, yet strategically, between men and women. The analysis yields three core findings under the ancient Near East socioeconomic structures. First, Mosaic engagement established a system of graduated risk allocation through which legal and economic "lock-in" shifted some risks from the more vulnerable party. Second, the requirement of formal dissolution generated an ostensively higher social surplus than regimes that permitted low-cost, unilateral exit. Third, a game-theoretic model shows that elevated exit costs incentivize ex-ante investment, signaling, and screening. This potentially produces more stable marital matches and reduces socially inefficient separations. However, the system is sensitive to relative costs, incentives, and risks. These findings complicate conventional accounts of patriarchal dominance by demonstrating that gender asymmetries in Mosaic law could also be institutional responses to commitment and enforcement problems. Theologically grounded norms, such as covenantal fidelity and marital sanctity, reinforced these mechanisms by embedding economic rationality within religious ethics. This paper aims to contribute to ongoing discussions in EUARE by introducing a Law and Economics perspective at the intersection of gender and religious studies. Furthermore, it engages with feminist and critical scholarship by demonstrating how ancient institutions may reproduce gender hierarchies AND mitigate their most destabilizing effects simultaneously. Historical gender inequality, economic rationality, and theological normativity are always concurrently constituted and open to reinterpretation in contemporary gender justice debates.