This presentation has two goals. First, I will define the term 'covenantal pluralism,' a task complicated both by the relative newness of the literature and by the fact that the term consists of multiple conditions. Second, I will examine some of the theoretical challenges and underlying assumptions of the term. Ultimately, I will argue that the term 'covenantal pluralism' requires further clarification if it is to serve as a useful framework for those working in religion and global politics. The covenantal pluralism initiative was formally launched by the Templeton Religion Trust in 2019. Stewart et al. (2020) argue that tolerance of the religious other is not enough for religious pluralism and offer covenantal pluralism as a way to go beyond tolerance. Stewart et al. propose three conditions that are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for the realization of covenantal pluralism. These conditions require further specification and are as follows: (1) freedom of religion and belief, (2) cross-cultural religious literacy, and (3) expression of character virtues. I will raise three challenges associated with covenantal pluralism. First, covenantal pluralism seems to presuppose a democratic society. If this is correct, the scope of covenantal pluralism is significantly limited. Second, the phrase "respect for human dignity" is intuitive, but this phrase is ambiguous (see Hughes 2025). This raises the question: what does it mean to say that we ought to respect the inherent dignity of the religious other? Third, while the covenantal pluralism literature has addressed the legal and political infrastructures necessary to support it, realizing covenantal pluralism also requires recognizing that interreligious engagement increasingly occurs on digital infrastructures, which introduces both new and familiar challenges.