Ordinarily, faith and religious belief (as well as the absence of faith or religious belief) are regarded as specific mental states — subjective states whose object may be either the subject itself (in a reflexive manner) or, for example, God. We will attempt to show that this psychological description, whether direct or indirect, may be useful, but that it should also be complemented by another approach, namely an action-oriented (or pragmatic) approach. We aim to show that those mental states (and their truth value), at least in the religious domain, must be understood in light of certain attitudes and in light of their pragmatic implications, whether moral or political. More precisely, religion might be described as this specific domain in which the truth value of propositional mental contents depends less on objective entities than on certain ways of being and acting. In other words: the existence of certain metaphysical entities would depend primarily on what they lead us to do in practice. In this respect, we will draw in particular on the philosophies of religion developed by Henri Bergson and William James. The key concept here would be that of attitude. This concept would be useful insofar as it makes it possible to situate different kinds of actions along the same continuum of belief: at that point, each action could be distributed along this continuum; and each action would express it in its own way and to differing degrees.