Session 3: One significant objection to divine impassibility is that it appears incompatible with the biblical narrative, which portrays God as grieving, repenting, becoming angry, and acting within temporal history. Such arguments seem to assume that the mode of God's relation to creation is available to univocal rational explication: if Scripture depicts divine emotions in creaturely terms, then divine affectivity must be metaphysically similar to creaturely affectivity. This paper argues that such an approach underestimates the theological difficulty of describing the Creator-creature relation without qualifying language about God. As a test case, I examine the traditional doctrine of creatio ex nihilo and ask whether the same qualifications applied to divine causality in the act of creation can inform how we understand divine impassibility. Because creation ex nihilo affirms that God creates without preexisting matter or prior conditions, attributing causality to God already requires an analogical and non‑univocal concept of "cause," since divine causality cannot be specified in the same register as finite causes from which our concepts are derived. I argue that this analogically qualified, non‑competitive model of causality can be extended to the entire Creator-creature relation. On this basis, divine impassibility need not imply that God is what Clark Pinnock called a "metaphysical iceberg" but follows from the same ontological asymmetry presupposed by creation itself. Impassibility emerges not as a denial of God's relational involvement in history but as a metaphysical condition for affirming that God's engagement with the world is genuinely creative rather than reactive. The paper concludes by suggesting that such an analogically qualified concept of causality provides a more coherent hermeneutical framework for interpreting relational language about God in Scripture by grounding divine and creaturely action in distinct modes of causality.