The rapid development of artificial intelligence raises renewed questions about the nature of human cognition and agency. This paper argues that an Augustinian reading of Thomas Aquinas's account of the intellect and the will can provide a basis for articulating the difference between artificial and human intelligence. When interpreting Aquinas's anthropology (for instance, as it is presented in ST I q. 82 and I-II q. 9), it is easy to read his thought through the later medieval debate between intellectualism and voluntarism. From that perspective, Aquinas's insistence on the primacy of the intellect tends to be treated as the central feature of his account of human cognition. If Aquinas is read in continuity with Augustine, however, a more dynamic and integrated anthropology emerges. The paper demonstrates how Aquinas explicitly draws on Augustine's psychological analysis in De Trinitate, and how the Augustinian account of the will, both as an appetite for a known good and as the locus of human agency, is preserved in Aquinas's account. This Augustinian-Thomist perspective allows us to reconsider what is distinctive about human intelligence. The uniqueness of human intellect can hardly be located in rational capacities alone, since the ability to reason coherently (to make rational deductions and to perform rational tasks) is increasingly shared by artificial intelligences. A strictly rationalistic account of human thought must therefore give way to a more dynamic anthropology in which the will, together with the intellect, is constitutive of cognition.