This paper focuses on how Said Nursî reconceptualizes political and social inequality as a problem of moral accountability rather than one of hierarchy or sameness. It emphasizes inequality as a moral problem, not a sociological or legal one. The central question posed in the paper is: How does Said Nursî reinterpret inequality in Munāẓarāt as a test of moral accountability, and what implications does this reinterpretation have for political authority and the principle of non-domination? I situate Said Nursî's understanding of equality within late Ottoman constitutional and political debates and ground his conception of equality in a moral-theological framework. In this framework, faith (īmān) and servanthood (ʿubūdiyya) constitute the basis of human equality, rather than uniform status, wealth, or power. Nursî reinterprets inequality not in terms of superiority or inferiority, but as a test of trust (amāna) and accountability. He frames authority and power as burdens of responsibility rather than sources of privilege, redefining political authority as service rather than domination, and thereby aligning governance with ethical restraint and non-domination. The paper treats Munāẓarāt as a work of political philosophy and, as such, as amenable to critical discussion through engagement with contemporary debates on religion and inequality. Particular emphasis is placed on Nursî's ideas as both historically grounded and conceptually relevant to modern discussions of inequality, responsibility, and social morality. The paper's position is to highlight compassion (raḥma) as a moral principle that moderates both structural and ethical inequalities. It presents equality as a shared moral standing before God, while allowing for legitimate differences in roles, capacities, and responsibilities. This is achieved by distinguishing between absolute legal equality before the law and differentiated moral responsibility tied to power, knowledge, and social position.