As is well-known, the Jewish Question is the question of Judaism's survival in modernity. In this paper, I will argue that Judaism's continuity is a philosophical issue with significant bearing on an analysis of the relationship between revelation and reason. Few modern Jewish theologians have recognized the connection between the philosophical conditions of Judaism's continuity and the relationship between revelation and reason. Moreover, most have embraced what we will here refer to as Akedah Theology or the notion that divine revelation opposes human reason or knowing and constitutes the exclusive ground of human obligation to revelation's commands. In what follows, I will argue that Akedah theology's rejection of the role of human reason and the human determination of 'truth' or 'validity' undermines the philosophical conditions of Judaism's continuity. To do so I will: 1) outline the philosophical conditions of Judaism's continuity, 2) examine Leo Strauss's Akedah theology of revelation to display the problem and 3) investigate how David Weiss Halivni's rejection of Akedah theology comports with the philosophical conditions of Judaism's continuity.