In recent years, Russia has positioned itself as a hub of moderate religious practice compatible with the modern state, as well as a model of interfaith "harmony." This vision is advanced through large international conferences on Islam, Buddhism, and (to a lesser extent since 2022) Christianity hosted in Russia, as well as through the creation of transnational religious networks increasingly directed toward partners in the so-called "Global South." These initiatives operate on several interconnected levels. Ideologically, they frame religion as a critique of the liberal-secular order and as an alternative foundation for a post-liberal world that emphasizes the "civilizational uniqueness" of societies outside the Western model. They also promote religion as the moral basis for "traditional values," social order, and family cohesion—key elements of Russia's broader illiberal appeal internationally. Equally significant is Russia's attempt to export a specific model of diversity management. Rejecting the principle of separation between religion and state and governing religious communities through official institutions, Russia advances the notion of "harmonious coexistence" among faiths—and, by extension, among minority and majority ethnic groups. This model is presented simultaneously as a uniquely Russian achievement and as a viable template for plural societies beyond its borders. Yet all aspects of this strategy are largely implemented through official religious institutions such as the Russian Orthodox Church and the Muftiates, and thus remain primarily elite-to-elite in nature. At the same time, global trends of desecularisation and individualisation of belief generate more fragmented and competitive religious environments, where traditional authorities struggle to maintain legitimacy. This paper examines how Russia's efforts to project interfaith harmony abroad coexist—and at times clash—with the more diversified and contested dynamics of religiosity.